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YOU DON’T HAVE TO BE A STRUCTURALIST TO HATE THE
SUPREME COURT’S DIGNITARY HARM ELECTION LAW CASES
RICHARD L. HASEN*
INTRODUCTION
In his characteristically thoughtful and provocative contribution to this
symposium, The Dignity of Voters — A Dissent,1 Professor James A. Gardner
offers a sustained critique of a line of Supreme Court election law cases
recognizing “dignitary rights” of voters. In Gardner’s crosshairs are Shaw v.
Reno,2 recognizing the “unconstitutional racial gerrymander;” Bush v. Gore,3
recognizing the right to have one’s vote counted in a recount according to uniform
voting procedures; and Purcell v. Gonzales,4 a voter identification case in which
the Court recognized a right of voters not to have their votes “cancelled out” by
voter fraud (or their “feelings” hurt by such fraud).5 Gardner argues that these
cases were wrongly decided: the cases increase election law litigation and create
uncertainty just before or after elections, when the societal need for certainty and
finality is the highest.6 At the same time, these dignitary rights serve no social
purpose. Gardner contends that voters voting in elections serve a public purpose
akin to jurors serving on a jury and, under this understanding, a recognition of
second-order dignitary rights is unjustifiable.7
In this brief response to Gardner’s excellent article, I make two points.
First, as I explain in Part I, Gardner mistakenly explains these jurisprudential
developments as the Supreme Court embracing the “individual” rights side in the
*

William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The title
of this article borrows shamelessly from Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be a Liberal
to Hate the Supreme Court’s Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998). That
title in turn borrows from the old Levy’s rye bread commercial stating that “You Don’t Have to
Be Jewish to Love Levy’s Real Jewish Rye.” See http://www.adslogans.co.uk/hof/ad_levys.html
and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_S._Levy_and_Sons. Like this article, Lowenstein’s article
criticizes the Supreme Courts unconstitutional racial gerrymandering cases, though from a
different perspective.
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James A. Gardner, The Dignity of Voters — A Dissent, ___ U. MIAMI L. REV. ___ (2010).
509 U.S. 630 (1993). See Gardner, supra note 1, at ___ (manuscript at 24-25).
3
531 U.S. 98 (2000). See Gardner, supra note 1, at ___ (manuscript at 24).
4
549 U.S. 1 (2006).
5
See Gardner, supra note 1, at ___ (manuscript at 26) Gardner also takes aim at and some earlier
campaign finance and one person, one vote cases. See id. at ___ (manuscript at 8 n.26, 36-37).
6
See id. at ___ (manuscript at 31-37).
7
See id. at ___ (manuscript at 27-31).
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“rights-structure” debate among election law scholars.
Instead, these
developments show the Court embracing a misguided structural approach to
election law cases (albeit clothed in the language of rights). Shaw reined in what
the Court majority viewed as an out-of-control Justice Department overly
interfering with state prerogatives in redistricting; Bush reined in what the Court
majority viewed as an out-of-control Florida Supreme Court overly interfering
with administrative recount procedures in the highly-charged context of a
presidential election recount. Purcell reined in civil rights plaintiffs interfering
with state administrative prerogatives in setting forth the rules for conducting
elections. In each of these cases, voter “rights” are merely a stand-in for structural
concerns of the Court.
Second, as I explain in Part II, using the individual rights approach, these
cases were incorrectly decided. Under the individual rights approach, the Court
should protect only “core” equality rights that affect the real allocation of political
power among political equals in a democracy. In Shaw, the Court incorrectly
protected voter rights in the districting process that had no potential to affect
political power relationships. In Bush and the voter identification cases, the Court
failed to recognize rights on both sides of the case, and that the rights of voters on
what turned out to be the losing side easily trumped rights on the winning side of
the case. Thus, Gardner’s conclusion that these cases were wrongly decided is
absolutely correct, even using an individual rights framework to reach this result.
The Court should continue to focus on rights in its election law jurisprudence, but
not on inchoate “dignitary” rights that fail to affect the allocation of political
power.
I.
DON’T BLAME SUPPORTERS OF THE RIGHTS APPROACH
FOR SHAW, BUSH, AND PURCELL

Gardner’s article makes many fine points about which I have no quibble.
He is especially interesting and persuasive in his discussion of political theory,
and the question of how to conceive of the role of the voter in a democracy.
Gardner is able to make considerable progress on this question by viewing voters
as akin to jurors engaged in public service, and this model surely has implications
for other election law questions frequently considered by scholars and courts.8
But there is one point in Gardner’s discussion with which I disagree, relating to
8

For Gardner’s more extended and nuanced treatment of related questions, see JAMES A.
GARDNER, WHAT ARE CAMPAIGNS FOR? THE ROLE OF PERSUASION IN ELECTORAL LAW AND
POLITICS (2009).
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the cause of the Supreme Court’s recognition of dignitary rights in these
controversial cases.
Gardner locates the cause as the Supreme Court taking sides in the rightsstructure debate among election law scholars. This is not the place to rehash this
debate, and Gardner’s article cites the relevant literature for readers unfamiliar
with it.9 In Gardner’s view, the Court has developed a rights fetish, and its
preoccupation with its conception of rights has blinded it to the negative effects of
recognizing mere dignitary rights in election law cases. Gardner tells us that
“[t]his is bad because the fights and structural approaches frequently conflict, and
the Court’s preference for a rights-based approach therefore often leads it to
decisions that are not only substantively wrong, but also at war with the
requirements of a properly functioning democracy.”10 He concludes that
[r]ather than approach issues involving democratic process as problems of
power or the proper functioning of a system of representative democracy,
as the rights-structure critique would require, the Court instead approaches
such issues as problems of the maltreatment of individual voters. Just as
importantly, the kind of maltreatment that counts is the kind that causes
voters to experience their treatment at the hands of the state as insulting or
degrading —that is, undignified. Thus, Shaw rights, Bush v. Gore rights,
one-person, one vote rights, ‘anticancellation’ rights — all
constitutionalize dignitary rights that voters may wield, as voters, to avoid
treatment that they subjectively experience as insulting, undignified or as
relegating them to some kind of second-class citizenship.11
It is true that in Shaw, Bush, and Purcell, the Court majority couched its
decision in terms of individual rights. In Shaw, the Court embraced what has
come to be known as the “expressive harm” theory12 that it violates equal
protection when one is forced to live in a jurisdiction in which voters have
purportedly been separated by race for redistricting purposes without compelling
justification.13 In Bush, the Court accepted an argument that voters’ equal
protection rights required that a jurisdiction-wide electoral recount be conducted
according to uniform standards for considering the validity of a recounted

9

Gardner, supra note 1, at ___ (manuscript at 2-8).
Id. at ___ (manuscript at 7-8).
11
Id. at___ (manuscript at 9).
12
Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,
506-07 (1993).
13
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642.
10
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ballot.14 In Purcell, a unanimous Court explained that voter rights could be
violated when legitimate votes are cancelled out by fraudulently cast votes or
when voters “feel disenfranchised” by such votes.15
Nonetheless, a close reading of these cases in the context in which they
were decided shows that the Court was concerned more about the structure and
functioning of the political process than about dignitary rights, and that the “rights
talk” was really just talk. What should be bothersome to a structuralist like
Gardner then is not that the Court applied a structuralist approach in these cases,
but that it applied the wrong structuralist approach, valuing some aspects of the
functioning of our electoral system more than others.
Shaw is a good launching point for our discussion. The North Carolina
legislature passed a redistricting plan that created some majority-minority
electoral districts with unusual shapes. Because 40 of North Carolina’s counties
are covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, a new redistricting plan could
not be put into effect until the Department of Justice “precleared” the plan upon
proof from the state that it had no discriminatory purpose or effect. The DOJ took
a hard-line position on preclearance, and insisted that the state draw as many
majority-minority districts as possible under the plan. With that constraint, the
state drew district lines that would create the required number of majorityminority districts consistent with the legislature’s political goals, including
incumbency protection and party interests.16
The plaintiffs in Shaw did not argue that their votes were “diluted” under
the North Carolina redistricting plan. Instead they made what the Shaw Court
described as an “analytically distinct”17 claim of an “unconstitutional racial
gerrymander.” The Court accepted this argument. Like Gardner, most election
law scholars have rejected the wisdom and coherence of this analytically distinct
claim. As Dan Lowenstein has persuasively argued,18 the Shaw case is a classic
14

Bush, 531 U.S. at 109.
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4.
16
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633-38.
17
Id. at 652.
18
Lowenstein, supra note *, at 780; see also id. at 784 (“Consider the statement [in Shaw] that
race “was the criterion that, in the State’s view, could not be compromised.” In the State’s view?
Why could race not be compromised, “in the State’s view”? Because the members of the North
Carolina legislature were driven by ideological fervor to create a second [multi-member district]?
Of course not. The legislature had already adopted a plan containing one [multi-member district],
but was forbidden to place it into effect by the Justice Department, which denied it preclearance.
‘Race was the criterion that, in the State’s view, could not be compromised,’ for the excellent
reason that the federal government prohibited the state from compromising the racial criterion.
The federal government absolutely required North Carolina to redistrict, and the federal
government absolutely prohibited North Carolina from redistricting without creating two [multimember districts]. That the racial criterion ‘could not be compromised’ was not a question of ‘the
15
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example of blaming the victim: the Legislature, in need of preclearance from the
Department of Justice under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, really had no
choice about the number of majority-minority districts it had to draw. Its only
choice was in where to locate those districts, a choice that the Shaw line of cases
limited significantly.
Understood as a rights case, and as explained in Part II below, Shaw is
weak. But it is more persuasively understood as a case in which the Court
attempted to affect the structure of the electoral process. To the Shaw majority,
the real problem lay in the overzealous enforcement of the Voting Rights Act by
what the Court saw as an out-of-control Justice Department.19 Through a series
of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering cases and voting rights cases in the
1990s, the Court ultimately reined in the Justice Department’s muscular
understanding of section 5, as well as a broad understanding of the scope of
section 2 of the Act.20 Though Dan Lowenstein is correct that the Shaw opinions
initially imposed greater limits on state authority to redistrict in contravention to
federalism rights,21 states ultimately enjoyed greater freedom as the Department
of Justice had to relax its requirements for the creation of majority-minority
districts taking pressure off the voting rights side of the problem.
A similar structural story may be told for both Bush v. Gore and Purcell.
Bush v. Gore’s equal protection holding has been almost universally excoriated in
its reasoning.22 But understood structurally, it seems pretty clear that the
motivating factor of the Court was reining in the Florida Supreme Court, not
protecting the dignitary rights of unnamed, and unknown, Florida voters. Thus,
Chief Justice Rehnquist viewed the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Florida statutes to require a manual recount of punch-card ballots23 as “absurd,”24
State’s view,’ but an objective circumstance imposed on North Carolina by the federal
government.”) (footnotes omitted).
19
This became clearer in the next case in this line, Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924-25 (1995)
in which the Court is quite dismissive of Department of Justice efforts to force a “max-black” plan
on the Georgia legislature.
20
In addition to the Shaw line of cases described in DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION
LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 197-242 (4th ed. 2008), see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,
520 U.S. 471 (1997) (rejecting DOJ regulation requiring adherence to section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act for jurisdictions subject to preclearance under section 5’s “effects” prong); Reno v.
Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (same holding under section 5’s “purpose”
prong); see also Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117
YALE L.J. 174, 199-200 (2007) (explaining DOJ reliance on purpose prong of section 5 until the
second Bossier Parish decision).
21
See supra note 18.
22
See Richard L. Hasen, A Critical Guide to Bush v. Gore Scholarship, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
297 (2004). For a rare defense of the equal protection holding, see Nelson Lund, The Unbearable
Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219 (2002).
23
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 2000).
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“peculiar,”25 and an interpretation “no reasonable person”26 would embrace. To
the Bush v. Gore majority, too, the United States Supreme Court’s “unsought
responsibility”27 was to rein in an out-of-control Florida Supreme Court which
was making up new rules for the counting of votes to benefit Al Gore.28 To
conservatives generally, the Florida Supreme Court was the lawless entity
changing the rules of the game after the fact to help Gore get elected.29
Purcell too is best understood structurally. Since the 2000 Florida
electoral meltdown culminating in the Court’s opinion in Bush v. Gore, the
amount of election law litigation has increased markedly.30 For obvious reasons,
the Supreme Court is wary of getting involved in such disputes, especially in the
days leading up to the election. Purcell was a case in which the Ninth Circuit
reversed a federal district court denial of a preliminary injunction in which
plaintiff’s sought to block enforcement of Arizona’s new voter identification law.
The Ninth Circuit enjoined enforcement, and the Supreme Court, in a surprise
order on a request for a stay of the Ninth Circuit’s order, granted a writ of
certiorari and issued an opinion on the merits reversing the Ninth Circuit.31
Though the Court couched its language in terms of individual rights being
on both sides of the voter fraud/voter turnout question, the upshot of the decision
is to keep similar cases out of federal courts in the days before the election.
Changes in election rules in the days before an election are disruptive and
potentially confusing. In Purcell, the Court not only recognized the need to
balance competing interests in such cases, leaving questions in the sound
discretion of the trial court; it also admonished courts not to change the rules at

24

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119.
Id. at 120.
26
Id. at 119.
27
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110.
28
As Justice Scalia told the television program “60 Minutes:” “Gee, I really don’t wanna get into I mean this is - get over it. It’s so old by now. The principal issue in the case, whether the scheme
that the Florida Supreme Court had put together violated the federal Constitution, that wasn’t even
close. The vote was seven to two.”
60 Minutes, Sept. 14, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/24/60minutes/main4040290_page3.shtml?tag=content
Main;contentBody.
29
This is the position taken by the conservative scholars Professor Amar discusses, including
Professors Epstein, Fried, and McConnell. See Richard A. Epstein, “In Such Manner as the
Legislature Thereof May Direct: Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE, supra note 5, at 13;
Charles Fried, An Unreasonable Reaction to a Reasonable Decision, in BUSH V. GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 3 (Bruce Ackerman ed. 2002); Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-aHalf Cheers for Bush v. Gore, in THE VOTE, supra note 5, at 98.
30
Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
31
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 2-4.
25
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the last minute.32 Purcell, far from being concerned solely with a vacuous
dignitary interests, appeared more interested in the smooth operation of elections,
which might explain the unanimous vote in the case despite the troubling and
controversial language about such dignitary rights.
As Pam Karlan put it in discussing Shaw and Bush, the Court’s project is
one of “structural equal protection:” “[t]he Court deploys the Equal Protection
Clause not to protect the rights of an identifiable group of individuals, particularly
a group unable to protect itself through the operation of the normal political
processes, but rather to regulate the institutional arrangements within which
politics is conducted.”33
To say that the Supreme Court’s dignitary rights cases are really about
structuralism is not to say that the Court got it right even under its structural
approach. To take Bush v. Gore again, to some scholars the Florida Supreme
Court followed the existing rules for resolving election disputes, and it was the
U.S. Supreme Court that changed the rules midstream.34 Thus, while all
structuralists can recognize a “lawlessness principle”35—that election disputes
must be resolved under the rules of the game as established by election day—
there can be considerable dispute over implementation of this principle in election
law cases.
In sum, Gardner should not be taken in by the rhetoric of Shaw, Bush, and
Purcell. In each of these cases the Court was more concerned about the structure
and functioning of the electoral system than about the dignitary rights of voters.
Gardner’s article is so important in stripping the Court of the façade of the
dignitary interests, which should force the Court to more clearly and nakedly
articulate the structural interests upon which it is relying and allowing for
criticisms of those structural interests.

II.
32

Id. at 4-5 (“Faced with an application to enjoin operation of voter identification procedures just
weeks before an election, the Court of Appeals was required to weigh, in addition to the harms
attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases
and its own institutional procedures. Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders,
can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.
As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.”)
33
Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw
v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1246 (2001).
34
Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, FLORIDA L. REV. (forthcoming
2009).
A
video
of
the
original
presentation
is
available
at
http://streaming.video.ufl.edu/~law/20090324-dunwody.asx.
35
Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Lawlessness Principle: A Comment on Amar, FLORIDA
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
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AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CRITIQUE OF SHAW, BUSH, AND PURCELL
As someone who has been associated with the individual rights position in
the rights-structure debate, I find little to commend from an individual rights
perspective in Shaw, Bush, and Purcell. As I have explained in great detail
elsewhere,36 courts (and especially the Supreme Court) should be cautious in
protecting individual rights, because broad pronouncements of rights have the
potential to ossify the political process and lead to unintended consequences that
hurt political participation. Accordingly, courts should protect only core equality
rights, leaving peripheral concerns to the political processes themselves.
Under these principles, the dignitary rights cases were wrongly decided.
Consider Shaw:
Taking race into account in districting violates no core equality principle.
It denies no one essential political rights; it does not violate the
antiplutocracy principle by taking wealth or property ownership into
account; and it violates no collective action principle. It does not even
violate any contested political equality principle that the Court might
recognize. In short, though the Shaw Court used the label of equal
protection, there does not appear to be any political equality problem at
issue in these cases. Even when the government “sends a message with its
conduct” in a political equality case, we should view that message as
irrelevant if it has no bearing on real political power relationships.37
As for Bush and Purcell, both cases have the same objectionable feature:
in recognizing inchoate dignitary rights, the Court maligns real equal protection
rights on the other side of each case. Thus, in crafting the remedy in Bush to end
the statewide recount of ballots,38 the Court violated a core political equality
principle: the right to have one’s vote counted. “The Court did so by refusing to
36

RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM
BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE chs. 2,3 (2003).
37
Id. at 142.
38
Bush, 531 U.S. at 533 (“The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the
State's electors to “participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process,” as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5.
772 So.2d, at 1289; see also Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220, 1237
(Fla.2000). That statute, in turn, requires that any controversy or contest that is designed to lead to
a conclusive selection of electors be completed by December 12. That date is upon us, and there is
no recount procedure in place under the State Supreme Court's order that comports with minimal
constitutional standards. Because it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December 12
date will be unconstitutional for the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to proceed.”)
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remand the case to the Florida courts for a recount in accordance with a uniform
standard.”39 When the Court ended the case without a remand, “it essentially
decided the presidential election, rather than allowing the decision to be
determined by votes cast where the voter’s intention was clear.”40
In Purcell, the Court purported to balance the fundamental right to vote of
voters lacking identification against the interest of supposedly disillusioned voters
who “will feel disenfranchised.”41 Aside from the fact that the Court offered
absolutely no evidence for its empirical statements that voters are deterred from
voting out of fear that their legitimately cast votes will be diluted by those
committing voter fraud,42 “the Court offered no explanation why it is appropriate
to balance feelings of disenfranchisement against actual disenfranchisements….
Moreover, the Court did not acknowledge that some voters might ‘feel’
disenfranchised when the state imposes barriers on voting such as a voter
identification law without proof that such laws are necessary to deter voter
fraud.”43
These points dovetail into Gardner’s observations of the inherent
weakness of the Court’s recognition of inchoate dignitary rights. Not only are
such rights ill-formed and ill-conceived once one properly recognizes the role of
voters as part of the democratic process. The recognition of such rights also has
the potential to blind courts to violations of real political rights that get shunted to
second-order status. That the Court has failed to recognize these violations lends
further support to my argument in Part I that these dignitary rights cases are not
rights cases at all—they are (misguided) structural adjudications aimed at
assuring the proper functioning and allocation of powers and responsibilities in
the electoral process.

CONCLUSION
Professor Gardner has once again shed considerable light on the Supreme
Court’s election law jurisprudence. Through a theoretical examination of the role
of voters in a democratic polity, Gardner has made a strong case against the
recognition of second-order dignitary rights in cases such as Shaw, Bush, and
Purcell. But Gardner has been wrong to lay the blame for these cases at the feet
39

Id. at 84.
Id.
41
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4.
42
Id. (stating that concerns about voter fraud “drive[] honest citizens out of the democratic
process and breed[] distrust of our government”). See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of
Bush v. Gore 35 (2007) (criticizing Court in Purcell for failing to cite any evidence supporting
this conjecture).
43
Id. at 36.
40
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of those of us who subscribe to an individual rights view of election law
jurisprudence. Properly understood, these cases are indefensible on individual
rights grounds: they are really structural cases in disguise.
For those, like Gardner, subscribing to the structuralist program for
deciding election law cases, the next task is to show how the Court applied the
wrong structuralist values to these cases, and what should replace it. One place to
begin is with Purcell. If I am right that the best understanding of Purcell is as a
structural case designed to keep last-minute election litigation out of the Supreme
Court, perhaps Gardner—who expresses similar concerns in his article44—should
reconsider and embrace the case rather than criticize it. If he will not, perhaps he
thinks more of the individual rights approach than he would care to admit.

44

Gardner, supra note 1, at ___ (manuscript at 36) (stating it is “especially damaging” for the
Court to inject itself “just at the point in the electoral process when the need for finality and
prompt conferral of a collective imprimatur of democratic legitimacy is greatest”).
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